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ABSTRACT | During the negotiation and implementation of the Havana Peace Agreements in Colombia, a twofold 
mechanism used to deal with the increasing number of socio-environmental conlicts has remained constant: 
the strengthening of the anti-riot police forces and certain institutional spatial assumptions underlying the 
promotion of a particular form of postconlict productivity. This article attempts to undertake a preliminary 
analysis of the relationship between, one the one hand, the enactment and threat of police power in 
socio-environmental protests and, on the other, the enforcement and reproduction of a sense of the territory 
as an object whose elements can be neatly fragmented. In contrast, socio-environmental processes put 
forward a deeply relational, luid and interdependent sense of their territories. Increased police intervention 
in these processes, we will argue, are not only framing socio-environmental conlicts arising from or linked to 
the continuity of conlict related inequalities as security issues, but also reframing so-called “territorial peace” 
into a territorial paciication.
K E Y WO R D S  | Author: antiriot police; rural protest; socio-environmental dissent; transitional justice
De la paz territorial a la pacificación territorial: los poderes de policía antimotines y el disenso 
socioambiental en la implementación del Acuerdo de Paz en Colombia
RESUMEN | Durante la negociación e implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de La Habana, en Colombia ha 
permanecido constante un mecanismo doble para tratar los crecientes conlictos socioambientales: el 
fortalecimiento de la policía antimotines y ciertos presupuestos institucionales sobre el espacio, sobre la base 
de la promoción de una forma particular de productividad para el posconlicto. Este artículo busca hacer un 
análisis preliminar, por una parte, de la relación entre la representación y amenaza de la fuerza de policía en 
protestas socioambientales, y, por otra, del uso de la fuerza policial para la protección y reproducción de una 
noción del territorio como un objeto cuyos elementos pueden ser nítidamente fragmentados. En contraste, 
los procesos socioambientales movilizan con frecuencia una comprensión de sus territorios profundamente 
1 Many thanks to Diana Maria Prieto y Alejandro Muñoz for committed research assistance, and to the organizers of the workshop 
and the reviewers at Revista de Estudios Sociales for insightful comments on a previous version of this article.
*  This article is based on a paper presented at the “Thinking About Law and Violence in the Colombian Post-Conflict with Jean and 
John Comaroff,” workshop, held at Universidad de los Andes (Colombia) in October 2017. It is part of a broader research project 
funded by Fondo FAPA, Vicerrectoría de Investigaciones, Universidad de los Andes.
** PhD and Master’s degrees in Law and Human Rights from Birkbeck College, University of London (United Kingdom). Assistant 
professor at the School of Law at Universidad de los Andes. Latest publications: “Understanding the Political Economy of Transi-
tional Justice: A Critical Theory Perspective” (in co-authorship). In Transitional Justice Theories, edited by Susanne Buckely-Zistel, 
Teresa Koloma Beck, Christian Braun and Friederike Mieth, 201-221. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis, 2014; “Depoliticization and 
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relacional, luida e interdependiente. Sugeriré que el aumento de la intervención policial en estos procesos 
no sólo está presentando los conlictos socioambientales que surgen de la continuidad de las desigualdades 
relacionadas con el conlicto como cuestiones de seguridad, sino que está reformulando la llamada “paz 
territorial”, en una suerte de paciicación territorial.
PA L A B R A S  C L AV E  | Autor: disenso socioambiental; justicia transicional; policía antimotines; protesta rural
Da paz territorial à pacificação territorial: os poderes da polícia de choque e o dissenso socioambiental na 
implementação do Acordo de Paz na Colômbia
R E S U M O  | Durante a negociação e implantação do Acordo de Paz de La Habana, na Colômbia, permanecia um 
mecanismo duplo constante para tratar dos crescentes conlitos socioambientais: o fortalecimento da polícia 
de choque e certos pressupostos institucionais sobre o espaço, sobre a base da promoção de uma forma 
particular de produtividade para o pós-conlito. Este artigo pretende fazer uma análise preliminar, por um lado, 
da relação entre a representação e a ameaça da força da polícia em protestos socioambientais e, por outro, do 
uso da força policial para a produção e reprodução de uma noção do território como um objeto cujos elementos 
podem ser nitidamente fragmentados. Em contraste, os processos socioambientais mobilizam com frequência 
uma compreensão de seus territórios profundamente relacional, luida e interdependente. Sugere-se que o 
aumento da intervenção policial nesses processos não somente está apresentando os conlitos socioambientais 
que surgem da continuidade das desigualdades relacionadas com o conlito, como questões de segurança, mas 
também que está reformulando a chamada “paz territorial”, como paciicação territorial.
PA L AV R A S - C H AV E  | Autor: dissenso socioambiental; justiça transicional; polícia de choque; protesto rural
Introduction: The disputed places  
of territorial peace
Throughout the four years of peace negotiations between 
the FARC and the Colombian government, “territorial 
peace” was an axis of both encounter and dispute. By 
August 2016, there was no doubt about the multiple —and 
at times opposing— meanings attributed to the term. 
For the High Commissioner for Peace, this idea implied 
two components: on the one hand, the recognition of the 
particular dynamics characterizing each territory and 
the importance of taking such diferences into account 
during the implementation of the Peace Accord; on the 
other, the need to incorporate and assemble regions con-
sidered marginalized or severely afected by the inter-
nal conlict into the country’s development. From this 
perspective, dramatic inequality and poverty must be 
addressed through development, as the mere ending of 
the armed conlict will not put an end to its causes (Jara-
millo 2014; Oicina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz 2014).
While this approach frames the responses to local 
needs and diferences within development —rough-
ly presented as a combination of local ownership 
and participation, private direct investment, mining and 
agro-industrial projects, the elimination of extreme 
poverty and entrepreneurship—,2 local movements, 
2 This is not to deny the complexity of the debates on the meaning, 
content and scope of development in transitional scenarios and 
Colombia in particular (see for instance Alviar 2016; Amaya 
organizations and inhabitants have been mobilizing 
notions of territorial peace that either oppose or at 
least question the premises and/or the ways of imple-
menting that developmental kit (see, among others, 
CODHES 2017; DNP 2016; Durán Chaparro 2014; Fun-
dación Natura 2017; Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013; 
Lyons 2016; Salcedo García 2015). Thus, for instance, 
the Rios Vivos movement is advancing an idea of ter-
ritorial peace as a process of local territorial planning 
which guarantees the cycles and processes of organic 
exchange between human and non-human nature. For 
this purpose, the movement is proposing the creation 
of an environmental truth commission whose indings 
could allow the recovery of those cycles and territo-
ries most severely afected by armed confrontation 
on the one hand, and by the results of development 
projects on the other; the latter, in turn, having caused 
dispossession and socio-environmental injustices (Movi- 
miento Ríos Vivos 2016).
Underlying the disputed agendas and meanings of terri-
torial peace is a clash of the meanings, representations, 
and interventions of the territory as a lived experience 
(el territorio vivido), its scope, and relational dimen-
sions. Here, the continuity and, at times, intensiication 
Castro and Olarte Olarte 2017; Franski and Olarte 2014). Yet, the 
analysis of the diferent conceptions of development disputed 
in Colombia is beyond the scope of this article.
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of socio-environmental conlicts3 during the nego-
tiation and implementation of the Peace Agreement 
begs the question of the consequences of the rupture 
from the past and, in particular, the depoliticizing kind 
of rupture that most transitional scholars and prac-
titioners seem to advocate for.4 While a proclaimed 
demilitarization allegedly accompanies the transitional 
process, anti-riot police presence —at times togeth-
er with military presence— and the use of force have 
both increased, as have socio-environmental conlicts. 
Current manners of dealing with dissident spatializing 
practices by turning to the presence and use of police 
power might be a re-instantiation of what Diana Oje-
da (2013, 760) has called “the conjuring of Colombia as 
a safe country under the production of a militarised 
sociospatial order.”5
In this sense, a question arises as to whose territorial 
peace is going to be enforced by police presence and 
force? How can we begin to think about the complex 
connections between policing and space, and a so-called 
postconlict scenario in which land use and access to 
natural resources have become issues of public order? 
This paper attempts a preliminary analysis of the rela-
tionship between, on the one hand, the enactment and 
threat of police power and, on the other, the enforce-
ment of a sense of the territory underlying the prevalent 
initiatives to fuel a productivity for peace. The critical 
approach employed to open a series of questions to 
examine the production of space in policed transition-
al scenarios where socio-environmental protest are 
increasingly restrained, draws on critical theories of 
public space, protest and police power (El-Enany 2014; 
Wall 2016) and transitions (Comarof and Comarof 
2006; Franski and Olarte 2014) as well as on combined 
contributions of political ecology and critical legal 
geography to the discussions on the formation and 
experience of space and territory (Blomley 2008; Elden 
2013; Ojeda 2016).
3 For the purposes of this article, socio-environmental dis-
putes are those that emerge between social organizations, 
movements, or people and institutional and/or private 
initiatives regarding the use, management, purpose and 
meaning of land, natural resources and how they relate to 
them. Although a detailed relection on the meaning and 
politics of the term is beyond the scope of this article, it is 
worth noting that this broad understanding draws on the 
centrality that the experience of place and space occupies 
in the disputes (Escobar 1999; Ojeda 2016) and the distrib-
utive dimensions that such conlicts entail (O’Connor and 
Martínez-Alier 1998).
4 For a critique of the depoliticizing efects of the manner in 
which transitional scholarship and practice standards have 
construed the notion of rupture from the past in disregard 
of diferent forms of socioeconomic continuities of violence 
see, among others, Franzki and Olarte (2014); Miller (2008).
5 Ojeda makes this critique when referring to the relationship 
between the promotion of tourism and particular forms of 
violence during former president Uribe Velez’s “Democratic 
Security Policy.”
The irst part of the paper gives a brief account of the 
situation of socio-environmental protests and dynam-
ics of dissent during the negotiation and implemen-
tation of the Peace Agreement, including some of the 
central spatial assumptions underlying the initiatives to 
fuel productivity and secure territorial peace. The sec-
ond section illustrates how antiriot police presence in 
two “rural sites in transit”6 —where the use and mean-
ing of land are disputed— attempts to deine what public 
order is, the audience for this enactment of order, and 
the representations of socio-environmental dissent 
as crime and violence. While these instances are not 
intended to be comprehensive or to relect the situa-
tion in the rest of the country, they do raise some ques-
tions that might help to trace pathways to think about 
how a deeply urban antiriot police displays force and 
presence in rural areas in transit, which are, in one way 
or another, critical to a post-conlict territorial order 
to come. Thus, the third and last section suggests that 
police interventions are framing socio-environmental 
conlicts arising from or linked to the continuity of 
conlict related inequalities as security issues. Here, 
I will argue that looking at the rules of engagement 
regulating police operations —an aspect often disre-
garded— might ofer some important insights into the 
translation of territorial dissent into security issues 
that must be neutralized.
Socio-environmental conlicts during the negotiation 
and implementation of the Peace Agreement
Natural resource exploitation and the increasing 
number of large-scale and mega-development proj-
ects in Colombia have run parallel with the various 
transitional initiatives carried out over the last ifteen 
years. As mega-projects signiicantly increased, so did 
socio-environmental conlicts and dissent related to the 
use of land, subsoil and natural resources. With regards 
mining, socio-environmental conlicts concerning the 
extraction of gold, oil and coal increased signiicantly 
between 2001 and 2011, but so did, from 2005 onwards, 
social protest against mineral extraction (CINEP 2012). 
In 2013, social protests reached 1027, their highest 
number since 1975 —a year in which CINEP started to 
record their occurrence— and an important number of 
these were related to socio-environmental conlicts 
(CINEP 2014, 6-8).
The National Agrarian General Strike (Paro Nacional 
Agrario), which occurred in 2013, became one, if not 
the most salient, of these actions. It grew out of, among 
6 With “rural areas in transit,” I refer to those locations broad-
ly referred to as rural in institutional peace discourses, legal 
instruments and policies, related to the reorganization of 
the territory during the postconlict. Thus, the concept does 
not necessarily correspond to what the binary legal frame-
work of urban/rural designates as rural. Therefore, these 
areas can actually correspond to geographical spaces that 
cannot easily be identiied as either rural or urban.
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other issues, rural protests against the failure of agrar-
ian policy vindications, the efects of counterinsurgent 
war on the peasantry —especially in coca plantations—, 
large-scale mining, agro-industrial and large-scale 
monoculture projects, and the destruction of ecolog-
ical resources. In particular, the strike linked social 
claims related to land use, and territorial zoning for 
productivity with both the conlict and the policies to 
be adopted in a future postconlict stage. Disputes over 
land use played a central role during the strike among 
the diferent sectors participating in it —indigenous 
and black communities, peasants and small farmers. 
Protesters demanded democratic solutions to disputes 
over water and wetlands use, the immediate suspen-
sion of illegal crop eradications, the development of 
concerted agricultural support programs, divulging 
mining corporations’ interests in the rural regions, the 
creation of peasant land reserves, and the construction 
and improvement of roads to take harvest to villages and 
urban centres (CINEP 2014, 10-11).
Then, in the year before the Accord and the months 
following its passing in Congress, over forty collec-
tive actions related to socio-environmental conlicts 
were reported in national, municipal or communitar-
ian media.7 Additionally, by February 2018, 9 popular 
7 Authors’ igures based on data from national, local, commu-
nitarian and alternative media. The igure comprises dif-
ferent collective actions ranging from strikes, gatherings 
and marches to road occupations and farm occupations, 
protests in all sorts of rural areas, and other forms of 
demonstrations. Some of the actions might refer to the 
same socio-environmental conlict.
 Importantly, its aim is not to provide exhaustive data. Besides 
replicating a rather problematic faith in igures, such a goal 
would be impossible to obtain given the degree of under-
reporting and selective coverage of these actions, and the 
vulnerability to violence to which much alternative media 
is exposed. Rather, it seeks to contribute to a longstanding 
efort to shed light on the questions these demonstrations 
are putting forward as well as to question the attempts to 
minimize them. A broad examination of the theoretical and 
methodological implications and discussions concerning 
the elaboration of this type of databases is well beyond the 
scope of this article. Nonetheless, there are both practical 
and methodological reasons for including “alternative” or 
“citizens’” media that are worth mentioning briely. On the 
one hand, it was impossible to access oicial police reports 
that showed the number of anti-riots operations across a 
given time, according to the motivation of the demonstra-
tions. On the other hand, the research stands on the premise 
that local and community sources contain unique and valu-
able information; this enables researchers to approach the 
analysis from the vantage point of the communities engaged 
in the social mobilization and afected by anti-riot policing. 
The point is not that alternative media is more reliable than 
mainstream or oicial media, but that it ofers valuable infor-
mation which enriches our understanding of public order 
policing in Colombia. It has been suggested that the rise of 
alternative journalism has signiicantly altered how main-
stream media represents and frames public order policing; 
perhaps it can also contribute to a better and more diverse 
academic understanding of social protest and police action. 
In this regard, see Greer and Mclaughlin (2010). For the way 
consultations (consultas populares) have been held and 
won against mining or hydrocarbon projects since 
2013 (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil 2018). By 
May 2017, 44 additional municipalities had been plan-
ning to hold referendums in order to decide on the 
future of their own territories. Of these, 26 will decide 
on hydrocarbon projects, 16 on mining projects, and 3 on 
hydroelectric projects (ANH 2017; Contagio Radio 2017; 
Rubiano 2017).
How do we come to terms with socio-environmental 
dissent after transition? The constant repression of 
protests, the continuity of stigmatizing practices, and 
the enactment of regressive norms that condemn 
and hinder protest, suggest that socio-environmental 
dissent will be dealt with through the use of force and 
the criminal system. Besides, the initiatives to reorga-
nize the rural to fuel productivity, reinstate a spatial 
discipline of the modes of relating to and experiencing 
land use and resources. Thus, spatial discipline —quite 
pervasive in predominant understandings of property 
law— tends to see the territories as areas and portions 
of land, as fragments that are fairly stable and indepen-
dent from each other (Blomley 2008; Elden 2013).
In a transitional scenario, re-instantiation contributes 
to hiding the continuities of socio-environmental injus-
tices but, at the same time, deepens an imaginary sep-
aration of the postconlict initiatives from the history 
of the conlict. In this regard, I would like to highlight 
three critical aspects that mark a disjuncture of the 
measures to fuel productivity from the history of con-
lict. This disjuncture, as I will suggest later on, might be 
permeating the way in which socio-environmental dis-
sent is treated and controlled. First, the set of decisions 
that reconigure the territory and the natural resources 
are presented both as a frame and a precondition of a 
“long-lasting peace” rather than as a part of the disputed 
meanings in transitional contexts (DNP 2011; 2014). As 
economic mega projects and territorial reorganization 
for productivity are portrayed as “engines of growth” 
that will lead the country to prosperity, and as a precon-
dition to overcome social injustice, political confronta-
tion gets blurred into a tautological justiication under 
the appearance of technical necessity. Thus, while a 
formal peace appears to be indispensable to promote 
development as investment, investment is presented 
as necessary to sustain peace. In this context, transition 
becomes an investment incentive since natural resourc-
es of every kind are presented as readily available.
in which mainstream commercial radio and newspapers 
in Colombia are commonly thought of as “loudspeakers for 
political elites,” see Rodríguez (2011). For the relationship 
between community radio, popular mobilization, and the 
construction of the public see González Martínez (2014); 
Murillo (2003); Roldán (2014). See also: El’Gazi (2011). For 
reports on socio-environmental conlicts in Colombia, see 
the Environmental Justice Atlas (EJatlas 2018) and the Obser-
vatorio de Conlictos Ambientales (OCA 2018).
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A second point concerns the centrality of property 
formalization programmes (Alviar 2016) for the ter-
ritorial reconiguration of postconlict in general, and 
for rural development in particular. There are forms of 
dispossession that are indiferent to or at least outlast 
the formalization of property. They are processes of 
dispossession without displacement which range from 
new forms of enclosures and the selective seizure of 
parts or elements of territory to schemes of produc-
tion that compel small farmers to associate to large 
companies (Ojeda 2016; Ruth Hall et al. 2015). In these 
scenarios, formal titling might provide the appearance 
of reparation while disregarding the possible linkage 
between past and present dynamics of dispossession.
The last point, closely related to the previous, concerns 
the institutional context of the implementation of 
the Integral Rural Reform set by the Havana Accords. 
Point one of the Havana Agreement, A Comprehensive 
Rural Reform, “seeks to lay down the foundation for the 
transformation of rural Colombia, create the conditions 
to ensure the health and well-being of the rural pop-
ulation” (Presidencia de la República 2016). It includes, 
among other aspects, measures to secure land access 
and use, the right to food for the rural population, as 
well as development programs with territorial-based 
approaches. Importantly, it covers all rural areas —and 
not only those regions most severely afected by the 
conlict. However, as pointed out by Amaya Castro and 
Olarte Olarte (2017), the institutional arrangements 
provided for its implementation “contain” whatever 
progressive or solidarity-based elements it may have, 
by disarticulating the “rural” from speciic locations. 
They do so by redirecting the postconlict territoriality 
towards a one-directional understanding of rural pro-
ductivity and economic development.
Three current spatializing practices, distributing bur-
dens and resources are particularly indicative in this 
regard. The irst consists of a series of policies and 
new agencies that seek to “demarcate and establish the 
guidelines for the reorganization of rurality during 
the postconlict” (Amaya Castro and Olarte Olarte 
2017, 8; author’s translation), in that they regulate the 
management and organization of those territories des-
ignated by the government as “prioritized rural areas 
afected by the conlict” (Ministerio de Agricultura y 
Desarrollo Rural 2015; author’s translation). To a sig-
niicant extent, these policies and agencies recentralise 
land use planning of rural areas into national- and 
central-level institutions and activate a sort of gover-
nance at a distance by reconiguring postconlict rural-
ity according to their compliance with their foreseen 
productivity. Even though they include multiple mech-
anisms of local participation, they do not amount to 
clear decisive instances. This is problematic, as an over 
centralized government has very often been posited as 
one of the main causes of the Colombian conlict.
The Zones of Interest for Rural, Economic and Social 
Development (ZIDRES) —approved by Congress in 
December 2015 and backed by the Constitutional Court 
in 2017 (Corte Constitucional de Colombia 2017)— con-
stitute a second salient example in the terms referred 
above. This law creates zones of interest for economic 
and social development in rural areas by opening vast 
plots to agro-industrial projects. Once the location of 
these zones is established, large extensions of State-
owned and allegedly unoccupied land, as well as certain 
private properties, will be auctioned to investors under 
a scheme of land use rights for an indeinite period. 
Finally, the third dynamic is the classiication of the 
whole territory into strategic mining reserves. This 
type of zoning would facilitate special concession pro-
cesses for further exploration and exploitation projects 
that might include a preferential tax regime (Congreso 
de la República de Colombia 2011a, article 108, Law 1450; 
2014, article 20, Law 1753).
Yet, the sense of territory produced in the current tran-
sitional scenario is complex and cannot be explained 
merely as a technology of State territorialisation, 
even though —to a great extent— central and national 
bureaucracies have played a key role. On the one hand, 
multiple groups and organizations have been foment-
ing an understanding of the places they live in, which 
contests the governmental representations of land, 
soil, and territory. On the other, the lack of formalized 
property rights and institutional information regard-
ing plots where a myriad of claims converge, might 
paradoxically play an important role in processes of 
resistance to those land interventions which rely on 
updated cartographic data.
However, certain characteristics of current institu-
tional initiatives created to fuel productivity for peace 
are reconiguring the territory in a way worth analys-
ing. In the case of large-scale agro-industrial projects 
—including the ZIDRES—, such an understanding of 
land (and its uses) will make it diicult to question the 
efects of large-scale monocultures and land uses and 
practices in nearby plots. In the case of subsoil mining, 
as pointed out in current socio-environmental disputes, 
the impossibility of intervening it without afecting the 
surface uses and relationality between the elements of 
both surface and subsoil is increasingly becoming the 
core of a radical underground politics.
Even though it is still early to assess the implementa-
tion of the Accords, these rearrangements of a post-
conlict rurality raise questions about the ways in which 
the reorganization of a postconlict rurality resorts to 
development as the natural bridge that will connect 
conlict societies with past and present socio-economic 
issues and injustices. The regularization of what is 
suitable for redistribution in this sort of geograph-
ical taming diverts attention from the detachment 
of sophisticated forms of dispossession from these 
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economic redeinitions of the territory. Such redeini-
tions appear in the public arena as external to political 
contestation (in terms of what is disputable and what is 
allegedly unrelated to the on-going violence). Dissent-
ing forms of relating to land and its resources might be 
precluded or appear as collateral issues related to the 
implementation of peace programs.
Further, uncritically channelling distributive demands 
and social justice through a developmental perspective 
entails an automatic acceptance of the way in which 
dominant conceptions of development address social 
injustice, such as the highly individualizing capabilities 
perspective (so often quoted by transitional scholars) 
or current forms of economic-growth-only oriented 
programmes. This situation also makes it diicult to 
identify those development projects that might have 
beneited from conlict violence, or from postconlict 
decisions, while having negatively afected the material 
living conditions of those most harmed by the conlict.
The current risk is that the institutional arrange-
ments for the implementation of the Accord might be 
providing a legitimizing re-deinitional moment for a 
re-coding of spaces and people according to their rela-
tionship to a distribution of the territory in terms of 
aggressive extractive projects. Thus, the transitional 
productivity for peace —as it is determining the proper 
use of land and resources—, might be sanitizing a polit-
ical economy of inequality. In other words, it might be 
immunizing the current re-organization of the terri-
tory and its resources from a history of past and pres-
ent complex forms of dispossession. Such a reductive 
approach would obscure the inequality of transitional 
distribution even further, to say the least.8
It is in these contexts that many local processes of resis-
tance to an understanding of the territory as a neatly 
fragmentable object are turned into security issues. In 
contrast to this perspective, those local processes put 
forward a deeply relational, luid and interdependent 
sense of their territories and their elements; taking into 
account, for instance, the luidity of rivers and subterra-
nean waters, and the experience of vicinity and access 
to water sources. Critically, as conlicts regarding the 
use and purpose of natural resources and the territory, 
continue, the presence of the Colombian anti-riot police 
increases in the rural areas where the conlicts take 
place.9 What function are the police, and the public force 
8 By no means should this be read as an opposition to the peace 
process. This critique is a way of shedding light and support-
ing the debates in favour of an understanding of the terri-
tory and natural resources as interdependent, which will 
probably continue taking place in the forthcoming years.
9 Information obtained from the Direction of Civic Security of 
the Colombian National Police in its answer to a formal peti-
tion for information iled by the author and own database 
built from national and local media, and communitarian and 
in general, to perform in such conlicts? What might 
their presence tell us about the institutional response 
to social protest in a transitional scenario? In the next 
section, I will look at the intervention of the Colombian 
antiriot police (ESMAD) in two diferent sites of con-
lict regarding the use and purpose of resources, land 
and territory. In both, the meaning of territorial peace 
continues to be in dispute. As such, they open questions 
about the presence of these actors in such contexts to 
continue a line of inquiry in this direction.
Anti-riot Police in rurality: Setting the stage, 
enacting the State
Formally created in 1999, the National Mobile Anti-Ri-
ot Squad or ESMAD is a specialized anti-riots group 
that operates to “contain and control disturbances and 
crowds, unblock roads and support evictions from public 
and private spaces in urban and rural areas […] in order to 
restore the exercise of rights and public liberties” (Policía 
Nacional de Colombia 2018, author’s translation). The 
role of the ESMAD has been part of the peace debates 
during and after the Havana Accords. In compliance with 
the Havana Agreement, various social organisations 
and movements across the country were convened to a 
national forum to discuss guidelines for the drafting of a 
bill which included: i) guarantees for, and the promotion 
of, citizen participation and other activities carried out 
by social organisations and movements; and ii) guaran-
tees for social protest and demonstration. The recently 
inished guidelines10 propose, among other things, guar-
antees for mobilization and social protest, and the dis-
mantling of the ESMAD as a repressive body to control 
protests, to be replaced by a group of Gestores de Convi-
vencia (promoters of a civic coexistence).
In contrast, some companies, large land entrepre-
neurs, and army members have demanded that the 
ESMAD should be strengthened in rural areas. Some 
have even asked for the creation of permanent rural 
anti-riot squads, which would prevent the occupation 
of lands and roads as a means of protest. Importantly in 
this regard, their presence in rural areas has increased 
alternative media (for the socio-environmental conlicts 
reported in national, municipal or communitarian media 
see footnote 7). Even though the information provided 
shows some inconsistencies, it is possible to conclude that 
there has been a substantial increase of ESMAD operations 
in rural areas where protest actions related to socio-en-
vironmental conlicts have occurred between 2012 and 
2017, and that in some regional headquarters such as Cauca 
and Antioquia, the number of interventions in rural areas 
during the same period were much higher than the urban 
(Policía Nacional, Dirección Seguridad Ciudadana 2018).
10 One national and six regional forums took place between 
the 21st and the 31st of March of 2017. The government 
will determine the necessary regulatory measures and 
modiications needed, based on the guidelines discussed 
at the national forum (CNPC 2017).
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signiicantly in the last 6 years, particularly in response 
to socio-environmental conlicts.11 This is striking to 
some extent. As I will show later, even though the 
ESMAD can operate both in rural and urban areas, the 
language deployed and the scenarios described by man-
uals and protocols are clearly urban, and its instruments, 
attire, and vehicles seem to respond to urban or semi 
urban environments.
In what follows, I will present two situations involving 
socio-environmental claims and protests followed by 
ESMAD presence and intervention. Each shows a type 
of police intervention in socio-environmental protests 
common to the Colombian context and very telling of 
the institutional response to socio-environmental dis-
sent: the presence of the ESMAD in road occupations 
during social protests and in police proceedings to regain 
possession in rural and non-urban areas. The irst shows 
the ESMAD announcing the State. The second shows the 
ESMAD re-staging the presence of the State through 
a selective and de-historized enforcement of private 
property. Drawing upon Comarof and Comarof’s per-
spective on police power and the staging of the State 
(2006), I suggest that these two examples show how 
ESMAD presence both enhances stigmatizing dynamics 
that dismiss protestors and their claims, and performs 
a sort of self-fulilling prophecy by constituting the 
proof of a likely disorder, an indicator that a gathering 
necessarily contains the seeds of a disturbance. Para-
doxically, anti-riot police presence functions as a pre-
condition of both the kind of setting that authorises that 
very presence and the police’s entitlement to enforce 
order by coercive means. This kind of problematizing 
presence will set the basis for the last section, where 
I will argue that dissent is being turned into a security 
issue. Here, I will close by highlighting the role played by 
micro-regulations in habilitating such securitising logic.
Robots announcing the State: Rural protests 
against the Ituango dam
In March 2013, there was a protest against the construc-
tion in north-western Antioquia of the Ituango dam.12 
Peasants, ishers, barequeros,13 women’s organizations, 
and arrieros14 gathered to occupy the road in a small vil-
lage in the municipality of Valle de Toledo. People were 
11 For the continuity of socio-environmental conlicts and 
the increased presence of anti-riot police in rural areas see 
footnotes 7 and 9.
12 The construction of the dam began in 2010. It was expected 
that half of the dam’s capacity would be completed by 2018. 
The project is being developed by a public-partnership and 
once completed, it will lood an area of approximately 80km 
long and 700 metres wide along the Cauca River.
13 People who resort to gold panning in rivers for a living.
14 People who transport luggage or goods by means of pack 
animals, especially mules.
demanding the inclusion of hundreds of families left 
out of compensation programs and protesting against 
the efects of the looding of the Cañon del Cauca River, 
including its efects on their livelihoods.
Then, the ESMAD arrived. The anti-riot police were 
probably expecting to be recognised as soon as the pro-
testors saw them, and were therefore also expecting an 
ensuing antagonistic reaction. Yet, some of the people 
had no knowledge of the anti-riot cops and the threat of 
force usually associated to their means of control. As the 
social movement for the defence of the river later doc-
umented it, “never before had these lands been witness 
to the ESMAD” (Ríos Vivos 2017, author’s translation).15 
Dressed in their heavy black anti-riot clothes and hel-
mets, “the way they walked and their attire caused laughs 
and verses” (Ríos Vivos 2017, author’s translation). Some 
of the protestors, moved by curiosity, dared to approach 
them. Some called them robots and attempted to get 
selies with them.16 The irst encounter thus lacked the 
usual setting for the display of the preventive threat of 
force to be recognized. For a few moments, confusion 
grew among the police, many of whom, sufocated by 
the heat, had to remove their helmets.
As Jean and John Comarof put it, “law enforcement 
may provide a privileged site for staging eforts […] to 
summon the active presence of the State into being, 
to render it perceptible to the public eye, to produce 
both rulers and subjects who recognize its legitimacy” 
(2006, 280). In Toledo, the police had to bring about a 
further —twofold— element in order to fully display 
State presence: public order and its deviant subjects. 
Indeed, most of the people did not perceive a gathering 
in a small town to discuss the dam and begin to march 
to the company premises and to Medellin as the viola-
tion of public order. The intended display of a threat of 
force by means of their presence —at least during the 
irst minutes— resulted in confusion combined with a 
sort of curiosity far from the expected and ritualized 
confrontational encounters in city sites.
Then, the gas came. Even though communities had a 
permit from the Municipality of Ituango for a peace-
ful demonstration, the anti-riot ESMAD surprised the 
protesters dispersing them with tear gas. The setting 
was placed. A display of direct instruments of force and 
phrases antagonising the encounter were the means 
through which the police made itself recognized and 
arranged the necessary setting for the enforcement of 
a recently created (dis)order.
15 The Programador (2017) is a planning book created as an ini-
tiative of the Ríos Vivos movement to document the resis-
tance to the Hidroituango dam since 2013 up to the present.
16 Personal Interview. The scene was narrated by one of the 
participants, who was very familiarized with the modus 
operandi of the anti-riot police in other settings.
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Then demonstrations of force were repeated and the 
antagonism intensiied. More than 80 people were 
charged with the obstruction of public roads. As it has 
frequently happened with the criminalizing use of 
this ofence, they were later released after the judge 
found the charges to be unfounded. Even though pro-
tests against the dam had been taking place in the 
previous months, what happened in March 2013 was 
a breaking point. As protests and social mobilization 
increased, so did repressive actions. Access to the area 
was restricted by the public force and intimidation 
intensiied (Movimiento Ríos Vivos 2013). For fear of 
violent actions against the protesters, more than 200 
people left for Medellin and remained in the Coliseum 
at Universidad de Antioquia for over eight months. The 
events of 2013 marked the future actions of a movement 
which has continued mobilizing a relational understand-
ing of the territory in a region where divorcing the 
efects of large-scale interventions of land and natural 
resources from the legacies of violent conlict seems 
more and more problematic.
The liberation of mother earth in northern 
Cauca: Anti-riot police in eviction proceedings
The occupation of properties associated to agribusiness 
and extractive projects in rural areas has been used as 
a form of protest against the use and purpose of land, 
and during the last 5 to 6 years, has been frequently 
dealt with through the presence of and coercion from 
anti-riot police. In a context where land issues include i) 
systematic overlapping claims and rights over the same 
plots of lands as a result of violent land seizure prac-
tices during the conlict and/or as a result of develop-
ment policies presented as a precondition of peace; and 
ii) intense socio-environmental dissents concerning 
resources and land use, the question of the purposes 
and limits of the use of public force becomes particular-
ly signiicant. Certainly, it is diferent to resort to police 
proceedings to reclaim possession in cases where prop-
erty rights are not disputed in the frame of decades of 
armed conlict, constant dispossession or the territori-
al reorganization for peace. In this context, a claim to 
rightful possession and the corresponding calling upon 
police eviction proceedings —even by coercive means— 
does not seem to easily it or respond to the complexity 
of land disputes.
In Colombia, possession claims proceedings for the 
protection of real State property and possession 
constitute a provisional police measure until the cor-
responding judge decides on the property rights in 
dispute. These police injunctions are activated, among 
other causes, whenever either public or private prop-
erty is disrupted or interrupted as a result of “illegal 
occupation” (Congreso de la República de Colombia 
2016, Police Code, article 77). Once activated through 
a complaint, the police will order the eviction of the 
occupants. The deployment of this proceeding to deal 
with socio-environmental protests is very problematic 
as it turns protesters into trespassers. Protestors usu-
ally occupy large-scale monoculture farms, mining set-
tings, exploration sites, or company grounds in order 
to demand for a diferent type of land use, to reclaim 
ancestral territories, or to resist extractive modes of 
production. However, the eviction proceedings make 
this kind of dissent a law-breaking conduct, construct-
ed primarily on the selective protection of property.
The increasing presence of anti-riot police during 
these proceedings in rural areas in recent years adds 
a problematic element of crime prevention in pro-
test. In the case of protests against extractive and 
mega-agricultural projects, the ESMAD’s preventive 
presence announces the possibility of a situation in 
which force might be needed, and it projects the eco-
nomic activities upon which a postconlict discourse 
relies as non-political. Such is a form of implicit removal 
of dissent. The case of the liberation of “mother earth” 
in Cauca is particularly representative in this regard.
In northern Cauca, south-western Colombia, the Asso-
ciation of Indigenous Councils of northern Cauca (ACIN), 
has implemented a “Liberate Mother Earth” campaign 
to claim the restitution of ancestral land currently 
used for sugar plantations and extraction projects. For 
them, these activities are progressively poisoning and 
destroying the Earth and its inhabitants. Initiating in 
2014, the purpose of the campaign is to recover lands 
in the municipalities of Corinto, Caloto and Santander 
de Quilichao. As part of the resistance, the indigenous 
communities —along with Afro-descendant communi-
ties and small-scale farmers— have proposed a debate 
on the possession, use and redistribution of the land, 
demanding an agrarian reform that recognizes collec-
tive land titling in rural communities in northern Cauca 
(ACIN, CRIC, and ONIC 2015). Speciically, they propose 
to advance on agreements and the delimitation of eth-
nic and small-scale farming territories, launch a polit-
ical debate on the problems of relying on extractivism 
and mega-economic projects —dams, mining, privatiza-
tion of air and water, diversion of rivers— as they often 
destroy the natural environment.
Regarding the usual presence of the ESMAD —on occa-
sion alongside the army— in their protests, the indige-
nous communities have consistently expressed their 
reasons to oppose such presence. Besides increasing 
their stigmatization as guerrilla members (despite the 
fact that they have systematically denied such associa-
tion), ESMAD presence is disproportionate, as the indig-
enous communities have always encouraged dialogue 
with the government. Sending the ESMAD to their pro-
tests and occupations, they assert, attacks their projects 
of land autonomy, collective rights to land, and digniied 
life. Further, they airm that the ESMAD often shouts 
during the protests, accusing them of land theft, of being 
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invaders of private property and enemies of economic 
development. Such accusations posit a great concern 
as they reproduce the arguments put forward by the 
sugarcane entrepreneurs, and by paramilitary groups, 
who have threatened them constantly. The ESMAD, 
they airm, “has turned into a repressive igure, that in a 
premeditated manner, has intentionally and excessively 
turned acts of social protests into murder sites” (ACIN, 
CRIC, and ONIC 2015, author’s translation).17
Many reasons motivate the indigenous occupation 
of lands. First, the territory they occupy in resistance 
to the expansion of sugarcane industry and mining 
projects corresponds to lands they consider “ancestral 
property of indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples 
that have been living with us for centuries” (ACIN, 
CRIC, and ONIC 2015, author’s translation). Second, they 
consider that government methods in place for titling 
and distributing lands do not work because restitution 
will take decades. Third, lands that are still in dispute 
have been either zoned or given in concessions for legal 
mining and large-scale projects by the government. 
Fourth, the small investment projects ofered by the 
government cannot respond to the complex land and 
territorial problems caused by the sugar cane indus-
try. For these reasons, they insist: “We will take many 
paths, all of them in peace, and all of them legal” (ACIN, 
CRIC, and ONIC 2015, author’s translation).
Despite the commitments made as part of the Havana 
Agreements, to guarantee protest rights and secure 
land rights to indigenous and black communities, and 
peasants, the recent occupation of sugar cane planta-
tions by a group of indigenous people in 2017,18 was met 
by a massive and threatening presence of ESMAD. In a 
meeting between the Armed Forces and farm-owners 
during the event, the president of Asocaña (the Associa-
tion of Colombian Sugar Cane Producers) demanded the 
creation of a permanent mobile anti-riot squad in the 
rural area of northern Cauca (“Proponen crear Esmad” 
2017). In turn, a mayor general said that the military 
forces intended to continue holding security councils in 
order to “confront these violations to private property” 
(“Proponen crear Esmad” 2017, author’s translation).
In sum, a socio-environmental conlict which manifests 
in terms of land use, property rights and, overall, a dif-
ferent understanding of productivity, was depoliticised 
17 Since 2000, they have registered 504 murders, both indi-
vidual and in massacres against the indigenous in north-
ern Cauca by the conlict’s armed actors and as a result of 
repressive actions against indigenous protests (Observato-
rio Pacíico y Territorio 2010).
18 The occupation and recuperation of land in northern Cau-
ca is not new in the same way as the constant presence of 
military forces and ESMAD is not new. For the attempts 
to recover land in the municipality of Caloto, in particular 
the hacienda La Emperatriz, see, among others, ACIN 2018; 
Gómez 2017; Mondragón 2008; and Suárez 2009.
and turned into a security matter that threatened prop-
erty rights considered productive:
I believe, a permanent violation of private property 
has been taking place and the indigenous, under a 
mistaken concept of property, which they call liber-
ation of mother earth, just want to get plots of land 
but they do not make them productive. (Delgado 
Henao 2017, author’s translation)
Thus, police proceedings to reclaim possession turned 
the protests against land use and conlict-related land 
issues into an act of trespass. The ESMAD enacted the 
threat of State force and the security councils held delim-
ited the space in order to deine public order around the 
protection of an ahistorical deinition of private proper-
ty, only understood in terms of present productivity.
The use of rural and non-urban roads, and private and 
State-owned properties, has become commonplace 
for protest against land and resource use, and modes 
of extraction or extraction itself in Colombia. What 
occurred in Ituango and northern Cauca instantiates a 
process central for transitional politics: these protests 
are not only creating new public spaces in rural or 
semi-rural areas by reconiguring the sites of dissent 
regarding the use, exploitation and destination of nat-
ural resources and land. They are linking the idea of 
performing the public to an understanding of land and 
resources as a deeply interconnected and co-dependent 
bundle of elements. Importantly, this depiction exceeds 
the geographical representation of land and resource 
conlicts as simply a matter of overlapping claims over 
areas or segments of the territory. Yet, social protests 
in general and socio-environmental conlict in partic-
ular continue to be the target of diverse criminalizing 
and violent practices.
Framing socio-environmental conflicts as 
security issues: Police interventions
In a context where socio-environmental conlicts have 
continued and even intensiied after the Peace Accords, 
what does it mean to police transition in conlict-re-
lated territorial disputes? The increasing presence of 
anti-riot police in rural and non-urban areas where 
socio-environmental conlicts and protests occur seems 
to play a role in enforcing a sense of the territory nec-
essary for the operation of the zoning processes men-
tioned above. In Ituango, anti-riot police presence was 
rendering a protest against a hydroelectric a matter 
of public order; a public order apparently unrelated to 
the disputed notions about the territory and the river, 
as well as to the modes of life threatened by the type 
of development underpinning the mega-project. In 
northern Cauca, the ESMAD was enforcing an under-
standing of private property alien to the history of 
dispossession of the indigenous in the area and, above 
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all, alien to a relational understanding of land and its 
elements. In both cases, the protests became threats to 
security in that they challenged a notion of production 
that privileges mega-projects and large-scale agroin-
dustry. This could be read as a form of securitization 
that violently separates economic decisions over land 
and resources in a transition from what is considered 
to be a political change thereof. This is all the more wor-
rying given the increasing presence of anti-riot police 
in socio-environmental conlicts in rural areas that are 
attractive in terms of large-scale productivity.
Yet, there is an element preceding the peace negoti-
ations that has been central for the operation of this 
securitizing logic but has not been part of many debates 
on neither protest nor transitional justice. It concerns 
the pre-existing set of laws and rules of engagement 
(protocols and manuals) regulating the operation of 
police and anti-riot police in particular. While useful for 
the type of productivity enforced by anti-riot police in 
socio-environmental conlicts, these rules also contrib-
ute to the continuous stigmatization of protest, as well 
as to the enactment and threat of force that set the stage 
for the display of a transitional State that approach-
es dissent as illegitimate disturbance. The manner in 
which these micro-regulations depict people gathering 
and the way in which they leave a broad and ambiguous 
space for discretionary powers to deine when the use 
of force must increase, justify their examination in the 
context of this article and an invitation to turn our gaze 
to their scope and modes of operation.
Manuals, protocols and the enactment of a 
regulated discretionary power
The enactment and enforcement of laws that associ-
ate, regulate, sanction or interpret protests as crim-
inal ofences contributes to the construction of social 
protest as a security issue. The use of law as a form of 
criminalizing protest has been widely studied (El-Ena-
ny 2014; Uprimny and Sánchez 2010; Wall 2016). In this 
sense, practices “common to social protest are crimi-
nalized by making them coincide with conduct that can 
be qualiied as a criminal ofense” (Olarte 2014, 153). 
Once acts of protests enter criminal proceedings, the 
frame of analysis mutates as the language of criminal 
ofences displaces the political content of the protests 
by, echoing El-Enany’s analysis of the criminalization of 
large political gatherings, presenting them “in terms 
of individual wrongdoing rather than acts of political 
contestation” (El-Enany 2014,73).
The Civic Security Law issued by the Colombian Congress 
in 2011 is an example of this (Congreso de la República de 
Colombia 2011b). The statue changed the usual dynamics 
of indirect criminalization of protest through the use of 
criminal law in order to include and intensify ofences 
that directly limited usual mechanisms of protests, in 
particular road blockades and disruption of public trans-
port. The Civic Security Law looked to strengthen what 
it considered a key component of the concept of public 
order, “civic security,” as part of the State’s criminal pub-
lic policy. For this purpose, the law created a new crim-
inal ofence (blockade of public roads)19 and increased 
the sentence for an existing one (perturbation of public 
transport services).20 As I have mentioned somewhere 
else, this law “turned into the standard bearer of the 
current government’s security policy in response to 
numerous protests taking place throughout the coun-
try” (Olarte 2014, 152). Importantly, road obstruction 
itself became a violent means that objectively justiied 
the use of police power.
But the direct criminalization of acts of protest and the 
enabling of equivocal limits between protest and crim-
inal ofences through ambiguous language by means 
of public order legislation are not the only factors at 
play in the construction of protest as a security issue. 
The manner in which the rules of engagement (manu-
als, guidelines and protocols) depict both disorder and 
protestors, shape the preventive and escalating use of 
force, as well as the practices of policing protest. It is at 
the level of these micro-regulations that the construc-
tion of the perception of disorder takes place. In Colom-
bia, the Manuals for the Control and Management of 
Multitudes are particularly telling in this regard.
The 2009 “Manual for the Attention, Management, and 
Control of Multitudes” (Policía Nacional de Colombia 
2009, 19-21)21 repeatedly stresses the importance of 
respecting the principles of gradual and proportional 
use of force. However, it not only provides diferent 
parameters to understand how the gradual use of force 
should operate but it gives mere police presence a 
threatening status. Thus, the irst reference to the grad-
ual scale for the use of force establishes that it escalates 
from “formations with and without batons,” to the use 
of smoke and shock grenades, pepper gas, water tanks, 
19 Article 44 reads: “Obstruction of public roads afecting 
public order: Any person that by illicit means urges, directs, 
restricts or provides the means to obstruct, temporarily or 
permanently, either selective or generally, the routes or the 
infrastructure of transport in such a way that it threatens 
human life, public health, food security, the environment or 
the right to work, will incur imprisonment of twenty-four 
(24) to forty-eight months (48) and a ine of thirteen (13) to 
seventy-ive (75) efective monthly minimum legal wages 
[…]” (author’s translation).
20 Article 45 reads: “Disturbance of public, collective or oicial 
transport: Any person that by any illicit means prevents the 
circulation of or inlicts damages to a ship, airship, vehicle 
or any motorized means of transport destined for public, 
collective or oicial transport, will incur imprisonment of 
four (4) to eight (8) years and ines of thirteen point thirty 
three (13.33) to seventy-ive (75) efective monthly minimum 
legal wages” (author’s translation).
21 This and the hereinafter mentions to the Colombian police 
manuals are the author’s translations.
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gas cartridges, gas grenades, multi-impact grenades 
and, as the very last measure, 37 mm calibre cartridges.
From this, it would seem that the irst action to be tak-
en by the police during a protest is to be present, with 
or without batons. Yet, shortly after this indication, the 
Manual includes a graphical representation of stage 
one of the escalating use of force entitled “The Demon-
stration of Force” (21). The corresponding image shows 
a group of antiriot squads raising their batons in the air. 
A preventive use of force appears irst as a latent enact-
ment of force to then be represented as a more direct 
demonstration of force as threat. Further, in relation to 
the progressive use of force, the Manual adds another 
vague parameter: the commander of the ESMAD will 
order the increase of the use of coercive means according 
to the impact provoked by the multitude, “always trying 
to obtain the best results to dissolve the disturbance” (32).
Another criterion upon which to decide a diferentiated 
use of force is the attitude of the citizen. For the “good 
use of force,” the Manual commands that the dose of 
force to be applied must take into consideration the 
progression of citizen behaviour as well as its degree of 
intensity. Thus, a third scale to deine the progressive use 
of force is introduced: “between dissuasion and reaction, 
the deployment of force must be graduated from osten-
sive presence to the use of irearms” (Policía Nacional 
de Colombia 2009, 20). However, it is not clear how to 
know when such behaviour is occurring.
Further, the Manual introduces a series of deinitions 
to classify multitudes and modes of “mass associa-
tions” in order to “determine the course of action” or 
activate certain police force actions for the control of 
multitudes (Policía Nacional de Colombia 2009, 23-24). 
These deinitions precede the instructions addressed 
to the general police and anti-riot police commanders 
to guide their actions during a demonstration. They 
include marcha, turba, motín, and disturbio among oth-
ers. By march (marcha), it understands a “displacement 
of a group of people in order to gain visibility before 
the State, to be heard and therefore to obtain solu-
tions. They can be peaceful or violent according to the 
state of agitation imposed by the leaders.” Mob (turba) 
is defined as “a numerous and dense group of indi-
viduals that have temporarily submerged their own 
identities into the multitude, and are almost exclusively 
reacting to what is happening in the immediate present 
and whose emotions mainly comprise hatred and rage 
in their higher level of agitation.” Riot (motín) is deined 
as a “disordered and violent movement of a horde 
against the authority.” Finally, it deines disturbance 
(disturbio) as the “action of mobs whose collective con-
duct has turned violent, and includes acts of vandalism, 
destruction and chaos.” It will then be up to the com-
mander to establish —once on the ground— whether 
they are, for instance, facing a collective behaviour in 
which the protestors’ own identities dissolves within 
the whole, or whether they are facing people reacting 
out of hatred and rage.
A new “Manual to Control Multitudes” was enacted 
in 2015 (Policía Nacional de Colombia 2015) to supple-
ment the 2009 Manual. It adds new elements to the 
already complex and, at times, vague protocols for 
action during protests. For this purpose, it divides the 
organization of the preventive display of police actions 
into three stages: planning, execution and evaluation. 
Besides shaping prevention in antagonizing terms 
from the outset, important steps in these stages con-
tain a level of vagueness that necessarily requires 
broad-ranging discretional power. Thus, during the 
planning stage, the respective commander issues 
an “order of service,” which must take into account, 
among other aspects, the motives of the manifestation 
and the length of the protest including its level of “per-
sistence and resistance.” Then, during the execution, 
and still as a preventive measure, police must set up a 
uniied authority post with the participation of military 
forces, 24 hours prior to the expected start of those 
manifestations which might give rise to an “alteration 
of security” or civic convivencia. The recently enacted 
and greatly controversial Police Code (a hierarchically 
superior norm to the Manuals) deines convivencia as 
the peaceful, respectful and harmonious interaction 
between people, between people and goods, and people 
and the environment, within the framework of legal 
order. Whenever a protest threatens convivencia, the 
police have the power to dissolve such a protest. The 
police can also determine whether they must act as con-
ciliators to restore convivencia. Yet, social protest can 
hardly be understood as a type of conlict that requires 
policing as a means to conciliate a solution.
Speciically, in relation to current socio-environmental 
conlicts, many protests concerning the use of soil, sub-
soil, and resource exploitation are not targeting or can-
not target a middle way or conciliatory solution. Also, 
the police have no jurisdiction to decide upon land use. 
Therefore, their intervention as mediators cannot go 
beyond the means of the protests; for instance, occu-
pations or roads blockades. As such, mediation ends up 
shadowing the claims and conlict at stake. Further, as 
explained in a recent constitutionality claim set forth 
against the Police Code, the whole convivencia issue 
is absurd given that “essentially every protest threat-
ens coexistence,” and therefore, no protest could be 
allowed at all.
One inal criterion in the Manual establishes that in 
the event of acts of vandalism or disturbances, the 
police will deploy the authorized means to dissolve 
the manifestation. Also, it provides a list of vandal-
ism acts —looting, graiti making, damage to facades, 
glass breaking, among other acts harmful to the gen-
eral good— that would demand acts of prevention and 
deterrence. Acts of vandalism are directed, it says, 
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against “public buildings or establishments or nearby 
places, inancial institutions, commercial establish-
ments” (Policía Nacional de Colombia 2015, article 17, 
2g). These markedly urban depictions and references 
aimed at both identifying threatening actions, people 
and scenarios, and delimiting the use coercive means 
seem out of place when socio-environmental conlicts 
and protests take place in rural and certain semirural 
sites, as demonstrated by the Ituango case.
These rules of engagement pre-emptively depict pro-
tests as contrary to public order, and multitudes as 
threats, while providing an ambiguous and wide margin 
for discretion in regulating the escalating use of force. 
In a transitional scenario, where socio-environmental 
protest are constantly criminalized and dissenting voic-
es often persecuted and murdered, we need to examine 
these apparently hyper-regulated modes of approach-
ing and delimiting the public more closely. Looking to 
the conditions that might facilitate the equation of ter-
ritorial dissensus with public disorder is becoming thus 
not only relevant but also urgent. This will contribute 
to our understanding of why a deeply urban anti-riot 
police and regulation are being deployed in rural set-
tings, whether and how the escalating use of force is 
tied to a predominant notion of productivity, and who 
is beneiting from the threatening status of the mere 
presence and appearance of police in some settings. 
Further research on the operation and the impact that 
these micro regulations might have upon social pro-
tests in transitional scenarios is much needed.
Concluding remarks
What does the enforcement of a particular understand-
ing of the territory and natural resources tell us about 
the relationship between transitional justice and the 
type of productivity to be protected in so-called post-
conlict scenarios? What is the preventive presence of 
police actually preventing? Is the removal of land use 
dissent an indicator to measure the eicacy of the post-
conlict regime to come? Today, socio-environmental 
dissent is still being portrayed as a barrier to produc-
tivity within multiple public and private discourses. 
Preventive anti-riot police presence is pre-emptively 
reading protests as insecurity, and insecurity as ahis-
torical violations of property and public space. Some 
of their means of action are thus making it possible to 
translate dissent as law-breaking processes, and pro-
testors as trespassers and criminals. Further, in regions 
and areas so often and problematically designated as 
stateless and/or unproductive, certain police measures 
and anti-riot police presence in particular, enforce a 
speciic sense of the territory through the lenses of a 
certain form of productivity. These situations remove 
from public sight the complex violence that sustains 
the points of foreclosure of an economic arrange-
ment of territorial spaces. Police, and antiriot police in 
particular, will not only be enforcing transition. The 
means by which this kind of police displays its presence 
might make and signify transition through the impo-
sition of speciic spatial relations that detach natural 
resources and land from the way they are experienced, 
and socio-environmental conlicts from their politics.
And yet, the question of what “territory” means and 
how and why it is policed, points to something that goes 
beyond a shift in the way police power is displayed. It 
signals a transformation in the modes of resisting the 
imposition of speciic spatial relations.
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